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PRELUDE
Linda looked forward to spending the weekend with her son.1 Truthfully,
she anticipated the time with her grandchildren much more-so. Her “sweetpea”
and “pumpkin” were lights of joy and hope to a woman surviving during the
darkest period of her fifty-nine years. The prolonged cancer that stole her husband, Robert, also wreaked havoc on Linda’s financial security and her own
health. A six-hour drive to California remained as Linda’s geographical obstacle and kept her from the solace of family. Final check of the necessities:
clothes (check), toiletries (check), phone charger (check), blood pressure pills
(check), marijuana (check).
Yes, Linda legally owned a Nevada-issued medical marijuana card, which
allowed her to legally possess and consume marijuana purchased from a licensed cannabis retailer.2 In 2016, the citizens of Nevada also voted to legalize
recreational marijuana, but the structure and procedures were not yet in place to
allow purchase without a medical card, whether Nevada-issued or one issued
by another medical marijuana state.3 Similarly, Linda’s destination also voted
to move from solely medical to recreational marijuana, but the Golden State
had also yet to effectuate the move in practice.4 Thus, since California dispensaries only allowed patients with California-issued cards,5 Linda made sure to
procure her medicine before she left.
Hours later, Linda sat not with her family, but behind bars where she faced
a federal felony for transporting a Schedule I Controlled Substance across state
lines.6 The FBI agent that Linda rear-ended in the chain-reaction crash on the
interstate seemed as uninterested in her medical marijuana card as he appeared
irrational in avenging his fallen steed. This subject is one of many Linda would
like to discuss with a lawyer. If one finally showed up that is, because, despite

1

Linda and her story is fiction. The laws which affect her are fact.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 453A.140 (2015).
3
Chris Kudialis, Las Vegas Marijuana Laws: Answers to Questions on Recreational Weed
in Nevada, LAS VEGAS SUN (Jan. 3, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2017/jan/
03/some-answers-for-your-questions-on-recreational-ma/ [https://perma.cc/EUF5-UG2N].
4
Kathy Park, Clearing Up Cannabis Confusion in California: What You Need to Know,
KCRA (Jan. 2, 2017, 9:57 PM), http://www.kcra.com/article/clearing-up-cannabisconfusion-in-california-what-you-need-to-know/8555949 [https://perma.cc/4RDE-E4HA].
5
See Lisa Rough, Which U.S. States Accept Out-of-State Medical Marijuana Authorizations?, LEAFLY (Jun. 16, 2017), https://www.leafly.com/news/cannabis-101/which-us-statesaccept-out-of-state-medical-marijuana-authorizati/ [https://perma.cc/V5EG-QF7S].
6
21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012).
2
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promises of due process7 and speedy trials,8 Linda started to feel more forgotten
and lost in time. She desperately needed her court-appointed attorney to provide her with the effective assistance of counsel the United States Constitution
guarantees.9
INTRODUCTION TO THE WAR ON DRUGS’S ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION
The War on Drugs has faced harsh criticism beyond the legally-possible,
factually-plausible tragedy of the Prelude, both for failing to cure the ills it purports to battle, as well as for the collateral devastation left in its wake.10 Though
analysis of the many possible benefits to ending the War on Drugs extends far
beyond the scope of this work, examples of just a few include addressing the
following: mass incarceration,11 disproportionate enforcement of drug laws
against the poor and minorities,12 the financial cost to taxpayers,13 black market
violence,14 penalizing instead of treating the disease of addiction,15 stunted advancement in medical research,16 disenfranchisement,17 and lost economic op-

7

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9
See infra Part I.
10
Matthew Boesler & Ashley Lutz, 32 Reasons Why We Need to End the War on Drugs,
BUS. INSIDER (July 12, 2012, 11:45 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/32-reasons-whywe-need-to-end-the-war-on-drugs-2012-7?op=1/#e-war-on-drugs-is-insanely-expensive-1
[https://perma.cc/X8YQ-P78J].
11
Grace Wyler, Mass Incarceration in America, VICE (July 25, 2014, 7:15 AM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mass-incarceration-in-america [https://perma.cc/YZQ4RXZV].
12
Erik Kain, The War on Drugs is a War on Minorities and the Poor, FORBES (June 28,
2011, 10:07 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2011/06/28/the-war-on-drugs-is-awar-on-minorities-and-the-poor/ [https://perma.cc/8KC5-BMNC].
13
Jeffrey Miron & Katherine Waldock, The Budgetary Impact of Ending Drug Prohibition,
CATO INST. (Sept. 27, 2010), https://www.cato.org/publications/white-paper/budgetary-impa
ct-ending-drug-prohibition [https://perma.cc/795W-5QDJ].
14
Jay Stooksberry, Want to Reduce Gun Violence? Halt the War on Drugs, NEWSWEEK
(Aug. 16, 2016, 6:30 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/want-reduce-gun-violence-halt-wardrugs-488879 [https://perma.cc/4GJM-TJVG].
15
Jack Cole, End the Prohibition of Heroin: A Cop’s Experience Tells Him the Drug War Is
Doing More Harm Than Good, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/
opinion/2014/08/24/end-prohibition-heroin/GRq3TO2RwX3IWDYTjY8UPO/story.html
[https://perma.cc/ZTV7-W3J5].
16
Nicole Flatow, Drug Prohibition Stifles Medical, Scientific Advances, Researchers Find,
THINKPROGRESS (June 12, 2013, 9:30 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/drug-prohibition-stiflesmedical-scientific-advances-researchers-find-8a76c4d85216/ [https://perma.cc/9VES-VH
2W].
17
Anthony Papa, The War on Drugs: Voter Suppression by Another Name, DAILY KOS
(Apr. 29, 2015, 2:16 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/4/29/1380986/-The-War-onDrugs-Voter-Suppression-by-Another-Name [https://perma.cc/RFB9-8A4Q].
8
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portunities.18 To this non-exhaustive list of arguments in favor of ending the
War on Drugs, we must also add preservation of the Sixth Amendment.
Public defenders across America struggle to provide the effective counsel
mandated by the Constitution.19 In many instances, the restricted supply of public service attorneys also lack the resources necessary to manage their assigned
caseload in a manner consistent with the Sixth Amendment right to effective
counsel.20 An overwhelming demand on these public defenders arises from
criminal drug charges, collectively known as the War on Drugs.21 As Peter
Rodino, former chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, expressed thirty
years ago, “[w]e have been fighting the war on drugs, but now it seems to me
the attack is on the Constitution of the United States.”22
This Note suggests an unsurprising solution to the many problems surrounding the constitutional intersects of the War on Drugs and the Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel. Part I offers a brief history of the Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel to refresh memories of the critical role
public defender offices play in our judicial system. Part II outlines recent public
defender statistics and case studies that illuminate the severity of today’s public
defense supply crisis. Part III reveals how the immense demand of the War on
Drugs directly and indirectly restrains public defense. Part IV examines the additional complexities and conflicts resulting from the evolving state of drug
laws and policies that negatively affect public defense. Part V explores the topics of drug laws and public defense in light of the federalist principle of states’
rights.
Finally, the Conclusion asserts that the War on Drugs’s demand on the limited public defense supply results in systemic Sixth Amendment violations addressed by a simple solution rooted in federalism. Specifically, the United
States should re-schedule substances to remove federal prohibitions and allow
states to more freely experiment with their drug policies and criminal justice
systems. Should states desire to continue the War on Drugs within their border,
they still must be held accountable for providing the effective counsel required
by the Constitution, otherwise their proscriptive drug laws should be stricken as
unconstitutional. Further, the federal government can establish a national position by regulating the transport of substances across borders and conditioning
funds to states for public defense and law enforcement based upon compliance
with federal recommendations. Doing so would marry drug laws and public de18

Daniel Indiviglio, Would Ending The Drug War Stimulate Economic Growth?, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 8, 2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/02/would-ending-thedrug-war-stimulate-economic-growth/35524/ [https://perma.cc/W3CR-X36X].
19
See infra Part II.
20
Id.
21
See infra Part III.
22
Steven Wisotsky, Policy Analysis No. 180: A Society of Suspects: The War on Drugs and
Civil Liberties, CATO INST. (Oct. 2, 1992), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analy
sis/society-suspects-war-drugs-civil-liberties [https://perma.cc/PU32-2SCQ].
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fense under complementary, federalist principles instead of imposing upon
states a standard shackled by national policies and underfunding.
I.

HISTORY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”23 Courts maintain a duty to assign counsel
when the accused is unable to employ counsel of their own choosing.24 An inability to employ counsel due to indigence requires the court to assign counsel
for all federal prosecutions.25 Originally a guarantee only for federal offenses,
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel now extends to many state criminal
prosecutions as well.26 Specifically, the Supreme Court first extended Sixth
Amendment protections to state capital cases,27 then to state felony cases,28 and
finally to state misdemeanors in which the accused faces potential jail time.29
Further, the Supreme Court established a test to determine when the assistance
of counsel is so ineffective that it still violates the Sixth Amendment right.30
Additionally, surrounding circumstances can make a trial so inherently unfair
as to justify a presumption of ineffective counsel without requiring an inquiry
into actual performance.31
A. Counsel for Capital Cases
The infamous “Scottsboro Boys” trial first established the court’s duty to
ensure counsel for the accused under extreme circumstances.32 Nine African
Americans from Tennessee accused in Alabama of raping two white women
were “appointed all the members” of the local bar.33 However, no individual
lawyer was named or designated to actually represent the accused until the
morning of the one-day trial.34 On appeal, after the accused were found guilty
and sentenced to death, the Supreme Court reversed.35 Due to the overall cir23

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 59–60 (1932).
25
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 459, 468 (1938).
26
The 6th Amendment is incorporated via the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).
27
Powell, 287 U.S. at 73.
28
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336–37, 342–43 (1963).
29
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
30
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
31
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984).
32
Powell, 287 U.S. at 73; see also Matthew C. Heise, The Scottsboro Boys Trials and Judge
Horton’s Ex Parte Meeting: History’s Verdict, 7 DARTMOUTH L.J. 208, 208–09 (2009).
33
Powell, 287 U.S. at 56.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 73.
24

18 NEV. L.J. 229, GIDDENS - FINAL

234

12/15/17 4:34 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:229

cumstances surrounding the case—the defendants’ youth and illiteracy, a hostile public audience, lack of nearby support from any family or friends, and the
looming penalty of death—the necessity of counsel was held to be so vital that
failing to make an effective appointment was a denial of due process.36 However, the Court at this point did not yet answer whether the right to assigned counsel in this manner for indigent defendants extended to non-capital cases.37
B. Counsel for Federal Cases
Five years after the Scottsboro trial, the Supreme Court mandated appointed counsel for all federal prosecutions where the accused neither obtained
counsel nor waived their Sixth Amendment right to counsel.38 Like the Scottsboro nine, the accused in Johnson v. Zerbst lacked education, funds, and nearby
family and friends, but these defendants were charged with a non-capital offense.39 The Court pointed to the “humane policy of the modern criminal law”
as providing indigent defendants with appointed counsel in all federal criminal
proceedings.40 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a necessary safeguard
against unjust or arbitrary deprivation of the fundamental rights of life and liberty.41 The Court declared the Sixth Amendment to be a constant admonition
that justice will not be done if this safeguard is lost.42
C. Counsel for State Felony Cases
Next, the landmark Gideon v. Wainwright extended the right of appointed
counsel for indigent defendants in all state felony cases.43 Under Florida state
law at the time, a court could only appoint counsel for a defendant charged with
a capital offense.44 As Gideon was charged with breaking and entering with an
intent to commit larceny, the judge denied the defendant’s request for legal assistance, leaving Gideon to act as his own counsel.45 The Supreme Court reversed Gideon’s guilty judgment and proclaimed the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated to the states the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel as a
fundamental right essential to a fair trial.46

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id. at 71.
See id. at 73.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467–68 (1938).
See id. at 459.
Id. at 463.
Id. at 462.
Id.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339, 342 (1963).
Id. at 337.
Id.
Id. at 344–45.
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D. Counsel for All Potential Incarceration
A decade after Gideon, the Supreme Court further broadened Sixth
Amendment protections to include state misdemeanors in which the accused
faces jail time.47 Jon Argersinger, an unrepresented indigent defendant charged
in Florida with carrying a concealed weapon, faced potential imprisonment of
up to six months for a misdemeanor.48 Florida found Argersinger guilty, but the
Supreme Court overturned the conviction, rejecting the argument that the Sixth
Amendment intended to retract the right to counsel in petty offenses still punishable by imprisonment.49 In what the Court termed “assembly-line justice”
due to hasty adjudication of the high volume of misdemeanor cases, the Court
acknowledged that inadequate attention is frequently given to the defendant,
thus endangering the fundamental right to a fair trial. 50
Additionally, the Argersinger Court announced the need for counsel at the
plea stage.51 An unrepresented defendant is less likely to be fully aware of the
prospect of being incarcerated or being treated fairly by prosecutors.52 As a result, an accused that lacks counsel may not know precisely what entering a
guilty plea entails.53
Similarly, the Supreme Court has concluded that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel applies to all “critical stage[s]” after formal charges are filed in
criminal prosecutions,54 such as: arraignments,55 post-indictment interrogations,56 post-indictment pretrial lineups,57 preliminary hearings,58 the accused’s
first appearance in front of a judicial officer after a formal charge is made,59
and the first appeal of a defendant’s right,60 including the first-tier of discretionary appeals.61 Finally, the Court held the Sixth Amendment mandates that
each of these critical stages requires “effective” assistance of counsel,62 a topic
discussed next.

47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972).
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961).
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967).
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1970).
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 194 (2008).
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393–94 (1985).
Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 606 (2005).
Lafler v. Cooper 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012).
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E. Standard for Ineffective Counsel
In Strickland, the Supreme Court determined the assistance of counsel
could be so ineffective that it violates the Sixth Amendment.63 For a Sixth
Amendment violation premised on ineffective assistance of counsel to warrant
reversal, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that his counsel’s
deficiency led to a different result in the proceeding.64 Continuing, a reasonable
probability is one sufficient to undermine public confidence in the outcome.65
With an ultimate focus on fairness, courts should be concerned whether a result
is unreliable due to a breakdown in the adversarial process on which our justice
system relies to produce just results.66 With the right to counsel recognized as
the right to effective counsel, it follows that simply appointing a lawyer to be
present at trial for the accused is not enough to satisfy the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee.67
F. Presumption of Ineffective Counsel
On the same day Strickland was decided, the Supreme Court held in United
States v. Cronic that surrounding circumstances can “justify a presumption of
ineffectiveness.”68 With this presumption, a Sixth Amendment claim can be
sufficient even without an evaluation of counsel’s actual performance.69 The
Court reasoned that surrounding circumstances may be of such magnitude that
the likelihood of any lawyer, competent or otherwise, providing effective counsel is so diminutive that a presumption of ineffectiveness is appropriate.70
The aforementioned Scottsboro case was highlighted as a model example
where surrounding circumstances made the trial so inherently unfair as to warrant a presumption of ineffectiveness without evaluation of actual performance.71 The Cronic Court reminded that the Scottsboro defendants were designated counsel in a manner “so indefinite or so close upon the trial as to
amount to a denial of effective and substantial aid.”72 However, the Court refused to create a per se rule of circumstances that would give rise to the presumption of ineffectiveness.73

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
Id. at 694.
Id.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 685–86.
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984).
Id.
Id. at 659–60.
Id. at 660–61.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 661.
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II. CRISIS: STRUGGLING STATES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE
In 2013, the 50th anniversary of Gideon, former Attorney General Eric
Holder described the current state of public defense as one in crisis.74 In a census of twenty-two states between 1999 and 2007, the caseload of public defenders increased an average of 20 percent while the number of public defenders increased by only 4 percent.75 The extreme shortfall between the supply of
public defense resources versus the caseload demand produces startling results,
such as the public defenders assigned to New Orleans misdemeanor courts that
are afforded an average of seven minutes for each client.76
With limited public defenders, pretrial detainees awaiting representation
clog the jails, judges are unable to clear dockets, detention costs rise, and, ultimately, states face a Constitutional crisis for failing to provide the Sixth
Amendment counsel necessary for a fair trial.77 Many states—including New
York, Louisiana, California, Idaho, Pennsylvania, and Utah—have already
been sued over such Constitutional violations.78
The recent crop of systemic challenges follow the lead of Hurrell-Harring
v. State of New York, in which twenty indigent plaintiffs argued that New
York’s failure to adequately fund and staff their public defense offices violated
the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel.79 Citing Cronic, New York’s
highest court held that plaintiffs can bring Sixth Amendment claims over the
surrounding circumstances of systemic deficiencies in public defense, which
lead to severe adversarial imbalances and breed unreliable judgments.80 Ultimately, Hurrell-Harring settled before trial when the state agreed to fully fund
and staff indigent defense in the five defendant counties.81 In the remainder of
this Part, I examine four states primed for systemic Sixth Amendment violation
suits due to a deficient supply of public defense resources for their indigent client demand.

74

Dylan
Walsh,
On
the
Defensive,
ATLANTIC
(June
2,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/on-the-defensive/485165/ [https://perm
a.cc/2SZF-ZV5T].
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Lorelei Laird, Starved of Money for Too Long, Public Defender Offices Are Suing—and
Starting to Win, ABA J. (Jan. 1, 2017, 4:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/arti
cle/the_gideon_revolution/ [https://perma.cc/2XSL-UJNN].
79
Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 217 (N.Y. 2010).
80
Id. at 225–28.
81
Laird, supra note 78.
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A. Down in the Bayou
In New Orleans, Louisiana, 85 percent of cases involve an indigent client
unable to afford counsel and are thus reliant on public defenders.82 However,
because so few attorneys are available after a budget cut forced a hiring freeze,
the public defender’s office began denying serious felony cases and created an
indefinite wait list.83 As of May 2016, the wait list still numbered in the hundreds even after 348 cases were refused.84 Will Snowden, one public defender
with a lightened caseload thanks to the wait list, expressed gratitude about being able to provide more effective counsel, but lamented the cost:
It’s at the price of people sitting in jail for three months, two months, four
months, whatever it may be, without a lawyer. And I hate for that to be the cost
of doing better work for the clients that I have, but then there are clients who
nobody is doing any work for. And that’s where the injustice lies, that these
people, case, their defense is literally just passing away with the passing of
time.85

However, after seven waitlisted indigents brought a habeas corpus petition
claiming the wait list violated their Constitutional rights, a judge ordered the
release of the men pending state appeal.86 The court wrote, “The defendants’
constitutional rights are not contingent on budget demands, waiting lists and the
failure of the Legislature to adequately fund indigent defense.”87
Louisiana’s public defense crisis is not limited to the unique metropolitan
concerns of New Orleans. As of April 2016, thirty-three of Louisiana’s fortytwo public defender offices were maintaining wait lists or refusing cases because of staffing and budget shortfalls combined with extremely high caseloads.88 More drastically, the Plaquemines Public Defenders Office announced
it would be furloughing its lawyers and shutting down due to a lack of funds to
meet the demands of its parish.89 As a result, more defendants were left without
counsel and moved to a wait list.90 Statewide, thousands sit in jail with no foreseeable legal counsel.91
82

Mori Rothman, Wait List Grows as Public Defenders Refuse Cases in New Orleans, PBS:
NEWSHOUR (May 1, 2016, 5:13 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/wait-list-grows-aspublic-defenders-refuse-cases-in-new-orleans/ [https://perma.cc/GSQ2-FVEG].
83
Id.
84
Lauren Zanolli, Louisiana’s Public Defender Crisis Is Leaving Thousands Stuck in Jail
with No Legal Help, VICE NEWS (May 13, 2016, 10:20 AM), https://news.vice.com/article/
louisianas-public-defender-crisis-is-leaving-thousands-stuck-in-jail-with-no-legal-help
[https://perma.cc/7Y4L-H7ME].
85
Rothman, supra note 82.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Zanolli, supra note 84.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Della Hasselle, A Public Defense Crisis in Louisiana: 33 of 42 Public Defenders’ Offices
Restricting Client Services Due to Funding Shortfalls, GAMBIT (May 25, 2016, 3:49 PM),
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B. Tarnished Golden Standard
Similarly, public defenders in Fresno County, California, are so overburdened by crushing caseloads that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
filed a lawsuit against California and Fresno County alleging inadequate representation violating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.92 In Fresno County,
public defenders are assigned up to four times the recommended client number.93 As a result, attorneys rarely have time to discuss the basic circumstances
of their client’s arrest or evidence for an effective defense.94
One of the lawsuit’s plaintiffs, Peter Yepez, spent nearly a month in jail before seeing a public defender.95 Yepez then bounced through nine separate public defenders between the time of his initial arraignment and final sentencing;
some of these public defenders told Yepez they did not have enough time for
his case and then advised him to plead guilty despite strong exculpatory evidence.96 Emma Andersson, a Staff Attorney for ACLU’s Criminal Law Reform
Project, commented, “The presumption of innocence is the keystone of our
criminal justice system, and it is profoundly compromised for the most vulnerable defendants when the public defense system is failing.”97 Even Fresno
County’s District Attorney condemned the public defense crisis as “bog[ging]
down the entire justice system.”98
C. Show Me the Money
In Missouri, the crisis reached a point where the Public Defender Director
sued his own Governor over funding restrictions that further burdened the
state’s public defenders.99 In 2014, the American Bar Association (ABA) released a study of Missouri’s Public Defender System that concluded a 75 percent increase in the number of public defenders was needed just to reach a basic
level of quality for the number of cases.100 Despite these results, Governor Jay
Nixon, formerly Missouri’s Attorney General, repeatedly vetoed and blocked
http://www.bestofneworleans.com/blogofneworleans/archives/2016/05/25/a-public-defensecrisis-in-louisiana-33-of-42-public-defenders-offices-refusing-clients-due-to-fundingshortfalls [https://perma.cc/74YQ-L7CN].
92
ACLU Sues Over Failing Public Defense System in Fresno County, California, ACLU
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beneficial measures like caseload caps and additional funding, both of which
would have lessened the burden facing state public defenders.101 Not to be outdone, Public Defender Director, Michael Barrett, exercised a state provision
that allowed him to draft Governor Nixon—a member of the Missouri Bar—as
a lawyer to take over a case for an indigent client.102 In a notification letter to
the Governor, Barrett began by reminding Nixon that his Governor’s office vetoed relief to overburdened public defenders in an indigent defense system operating under significant stresses while ranked 49th in the nation in terms of
funding.103
Unfortunately, Louisiana, California, and Missouri are indicative of—not
exceptions to—a nationwide crisis.104 Norman Lefstein, an expert in indigent
defense and dean emeritus at McKinney School of Law at Indiana University,
acknowledged that the situation in Louisiana is not unusual because the Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel is breached every day the courts are in
session all over the United States.105 Similar to the suit against Fresno County,
the ACLU has brought actions against Idaho, New York, Washington, Michigan, and Louisiana, alleging systemic failures to provide effective counsel.106
D. Born to Battle
Finally, in Nevada, a 2013 study by the Sixth Amendment Center concluded that serious problems exist, especially in rural areas of the state, ensuring
counsel for poor individuals facing a potential loss of liberty.107 Specifically,
“[t]he indigent accused may sit in jail for several weeks or even months, waiting to speak to an attorney.”108 Once the state does appoint counsel, that defendant is likely to be one of several hundred other defendants vying for the attention of that same attorney at the same time.109 Addressing the systemic
deficiencies in Nevada’s current ability to meet the Constitutional requirements
of the Sixth Amendment and Gideon, Nevada Supreme Court Justice Michael
Cherry stated, “Nevada’s rural counties simply cannot shoulder the state’s obligations under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution any longer.”110
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This statement becomes even more devastating in light of a single fact concerning Nevada’s longstanding history of ensuring justice equality for the poor.
Almost one hundred years before Gideon, Nevada became the first state in the
nation to appoint attorneys for all criminal matters, including misdemeanors,
making it one of the bedrock principles upon which the state established its
identity.111
Before moving on to examine factors that significantly feed the public defense crisis, just a quick reminder that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment
right to effective counsel is to protect all individuals against potential governmental tyranny by ensuring that the least financially secure among us are protected. As Jonathan Rapping, president and founder of the Gideon’s Promise
advocacy organization noted, “If we believe in equal justice, then the single
most important thing to do is make sure poor people have the kinds of lawyers
richer people would have.”112 Yet, Gideon’s promise of effective counsel does
not just encompass providing lawyers of comparable skills and abilities. The
surrounding circumstances must also allow these highly competent, knowledgeable, and passionate public defenders the opportunity and resources to
provide the zealous advocacy necessary to comply with the Sixth Amendment.
Still, increasing the potential for “rich people” public defenders by expanding
the pool of full-time public defenders does, at least, partly address the supply
side of the burden equation.
Unfortunately, estimates based upon recommended caseload maximums
for public defenders reveal that almost 7,000 more public defenders are needed
just to address the current caseload.113 In the meantime, current public defenders face a reality where “[t]here isn’t time to uncover the facts, to marinate in
them, to do the research necessary,” according to Derrick Carson, Chief Public
Defender in Concordia Parish, Louisiana.114 Even more unsettling is Carson’s
ultimate characterization of the entire scenario: “It becomes like herding cattle.”115 Keep this dehumanization of indigent defendants to lower-than-secondclass citizens in mind as we turn next to the demand side of the defense burden
equation.
III. SHACKLES: DRUG LAWS RESTRAIN EFFECTIVE PUBLIC DEFENSE
In a familiar refrain, a 1990 article exploring the War on Drugs’s impact on
the courts quoted District Judge Lucius Benton of Texas as saying they were
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“just running them through here like cattle.”116 At that time, “the number of
drug cases [had already] increased by 270 percent” over the previous decade.117
This staggering explosion in volume left judges and lawyers—both defense and
prosecution—attributing to the War on Drugs the “unintended consequences”
of overwhelming public defenders, substantially shifting the balance of power
to prosecutors, and “impairing the quality of justice.”118
The demand from drug cases both directly and indirectly restrains the ability of public defenders to provide the effective counsel the Constitution mandates, while deferred resources reinforce the disparity shackles on public defenders against their better-supplied prosecutorial adversaries. The direct
restraint manifests in the overwhelming number of cases involving indigent clients charged with drug offenses, a situation abetted by vastly disproportionate
drug law enforcement against the poor, i.e. those less able to afford counsel and
who thus need public defender assistance.119 Indirectly, public defense is restrained by a limited-resource judicial system taxed at every point of administration with diminished time for critical stages such as plea-bargaining.120 Finally, the time, effort, and funds spent elsewhere—whether on law
enforcement, prisons and other corrections, or especially the prosecution—are
all resources unavailable to alleviate the public defense crisis and thus enable
the adversarial advantage.121
A. The Direct Restraint of Increased Caseloads
One restraint on effective public defense is the seemingly endless number
of individuals charged with low-level offenses—such as drug violations—
whom public defenders are most frequently called upon to represent.122 Nationwide, public defenders represent 80 percent of criminal defendants,123 and
drug violations constitute the single highest category of arrests with a new ar116
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rest made every twenty-one seconds.124 This rate produces approximately one
and a half million drug arrests each year.125 Over 80 percent of these drug violations are for simple possession, and half of those are for marijuana.126 Regarding their share of the total number of arrests for all offenses, drugs crimes increased from less than 4 percent in 1973 to almost 14 percent in 2015.127
Incarceration statistics also clearly illuminate the War on Drugs’s expanding contribution to the criminal caseload weight. First, while the number of
criminal offenders within each major category of offenses increased between
1995 and 2003, the number incarcerated for drug offenses accounted for the
single largest percentage of the growth.128 Of the 1,316,409 people serving a
sentence in a state prison at the end of 2014, over 200,000 of these prisoners
had a drug charge as their most serious offense.129 Among those serving time in
a United States federal prison on the date of September 30, 2015, a drug offense was the most serious charge for almost half of all inmates.130
The arrest and incarceration statistics become even more striking when
combined with the knowledge that public defenders have seen their share of the
total caseload increase as well. The share of felons in large counties who used
public defenders increased between 1992 and 1996 from 59 percent to 68 percent.131 To remind, public defenders represent about 80 percent of all criminal
defendants nationwide.132 Although white-collar crimes have seen their defendants represented by private counsel to a higher degree, public defenders represent a higher percentage of drug offenders.133 Continuing, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers reported there were over 10,000,000
misdemeanor prosecutions in 2006 alone.134 Again, the vast majority of these
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defendants needed the assistance of an effective public defender because they
could not afford private counsel of their own.135
Prosecutors nationally are also overburdened with excessive caseloads, yet,
in a perverse twist, an overburdened state further detriments the defense.136
Prosecutors are unable to timely bring cases to trial, resulting in many defendants remaining incarcerated for months or even years if they are unable to post
bail.137 The oft-terrible incarceration conditions then lead defendants to accept
less-than-favorable plea bargains than what might be afforded with a timely trial and effective counsel.138 Even worse, some who are innocent of the crimes
for which they are accused plead guilty just to end their incarceration.139
B. The Indirect Restraint of a Taxed System
The War on Drugs impacts the entire criminal justice system by taxing the
stretched-thin resources at every stage in the process, from arrest to adjudication, and incarceration to post-release supervision.140 Jeff Whitacre, Commissioner of an Ohio county whose Public Defender Office handled 2 percent more
cases in 2014 than 2013—a year which saw the all-time high number of cases
for the office—correctly remarked that the public defender is one of many
branches in the judicial system feeling the weight of the War on Drugs.141
One of the critical stages adversely affected by this pressure from the War
on Drugs is plea-bargaining. With almost 90 percent of criminal defendants
ending their cases by pleading guilty without a full trial, the primary justification for seeking bargains is typically said to be efficiently minimizing stress on
both the process and the players in the criminal justice system.142 However,
critics argue that plea bargains give an unfair advantage to prosecutors who use
it as a tool to undermine the Sixth Amendment.143 Many prosecutors strong-arm
drug defendants with coercive tactics that put an enormous pressure on them to
accept a plea offer they cannot afford to refuse.144 The historically low rate of
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federal drug defendants going to trial—only 3 percent—likely reflects an unbalanced criminal justice system fertile for systemic ineffective assistance of
counsel.145 When the Argersinger Court extended the Sixth Amendment right
to effective counsel to include the critical pleading stage, the Court noted that
the volume of cases “may create an obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the result.”146
Ultimately, the focus on nonviolent, low-level offenses like drug possession clogs the criminal justice system and diverts criminal justice resources, especially from public defenders.147 Although representing these drug-charge clients often does not individually consume much time, cumulatively the sheer
volume of cases taxes resources on a systemic level.148 While each case remains
open, public defenders, prosecutors, judges, and other judicial officers attend
arraignments and other hearings, negotiate pleas, file and argue motions, and
complete any other necessary work to manage the assembly-line of concurrent
cases.149 As stated in a 2013 paper published by the Brennan Center for Justice
for the 50th anniversary of Gideon, “simple possession of drugs may be the
most frequent charge that saps public defense and other criminal justice resources. . . .”150
C. The Adversarial Restraint of Deferred Resources
Finally, the War on Drugs deepens the chasm between the financial resources potentially available for public defense versus those accessible to the
prosecution by displacing funds to criminalize—instead of understanding and
treating—drug use, abuse, and addiction.151 The Drug Policy Alliance estimates
that, over a four-decade period, taxpayers in America have spent one trillion
dollars on the War on Drugs.152 When accounting for state and local spending,
the annual cost reaches over fifty billion dollars.153 Meanwhile, the lack of
funds available for public defenders restrains their ability to conduct basic in-
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vestigations or employ expert witnesses, both of which are necessary for an effective defense.154
The obscene amount spent on the War on Drugs does not appear to be
sound policy in light of the difficulties faced by public defenders in providing
effective counsel, especially against disproportionally better-funded prosecutions. The total spending of state prosecutors exceeded that of public defenders
by over three billion dollars in 2007 alone.155 In California, the annual budget
for prosecutors was about three hundred million dollars more than for public
defenders.156 Additionally, as of 2008, American taxpayers spent fourteen times
more on corrections than on public defense.157
Perhaps even more distressing, the financial windfall of prosecutors over
their public defense adversaries persists in the face of more cost-effective alternatives to addressing concerns surrounding illicit drugs.158 For example, treating drug addiction within communities is considered to be a very cost-effective
way to prevent crimes.159 The cost of incarceration exceeds the more humane
approach of treatment by approximately twenty thousand dollars per person per
year.160 Further, the Washington State Institute for Public Policy produced a
study that found that every dollar spent on drug treatment yielded almost twenty dollars in savings related to crime in the community.161 On the other hand,
prisons were found to yield only thirty-seven cents in public safety per every
dollar spent.162
Knowing the public defense struggle to achieve the Constitutionallymandated standard of effective counsel, the financial disadvantage public defenders face against their State adversaries, and policymakers’ reckless abandon towards prioritizing the more-costly and less-effective path of punishment
over treatment, one must pause to question the War on Drugs’s true intent. In
his article on the erosion of a range of civil liberties under the War on Drugs,
Paul Finkelman did not mince words: “The whole conduct of the war on drugs
appears to be aimed at crippling the defense capabilities of the accused.”163
Finkelman observed that, although public defenders are highly knowledgeable
about criminal law, their offices are so underfunded and overworked that they
are rarely likely to have the proper resources necessary to defend the indigent
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accused against the government.164 Moving forward, this troubling situation
will only worsen as the War on Drugs continues.165
IV. CONFLICT: ADMINISTRATION OF AN EVOLVING WAR ON DRUGS
Drug laws and policies within the United States at both the state and the
federal level are in constant flux. In the 2016 elections, four states (California,
Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada) voted to legalize adult recreational marijuana.166 An additional four states (Arkansas, Florida, Montana, and North Dakota) voted to approve marijuana for medicinal purposes.167 Marijuana’s sole ballot measure defeat of the election season occurred in Arizona, whose citizens
narrowly declined to expand their medicinal allowance to adult recreation.168
As a result, more than half the states and the District of Columbia currently
have laws legalizing marijuana, whether for recreation or solely for medicinal
purposes.169
A. Past and Present Evolutions
Despite the moves by individual states to decriminalize marijuana, the Supreme Court held that Congress may still criminalize the production and use of
homegrown marijuana as a federal offense even when states allow the legal use
for medicinal purposes.170 Further, the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) announced in 2016 that marijuana will remain classified as a Schedule I
drug under the Controlled Substance Act.171 One effect of such classification
requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to declare that marijuana has
no medical use.172 Thus, states that allow medicinal use—or even legal recreational use—of marijuana do so in defiance of federal law.173 Additionally, physicians who prescribe medicinal marijuana to patients struggling with the pains
of terminal illnesses in states that allow this treatment are also in violation of
federal law.174
164
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However, the Ninth Circuit recently held that federal judges should stop
prosecutions for conduct authorized in state medical marijuana laws by enforcing section 542 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act.175 The court announced that section 542 prohibits the Department of Justice (DOJ) from
spending funds on “actions that prevent the Medical Marijuana States’ giving
practical effect to their state laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”176 Still, this decision comes from only a single federal circuit. Not coincidentally, seven of the nine states within the
Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, including more than half of the nation’s recreational marijuana states, allow conditional marijuana use.177
This conflict between federal and state law generates cases that stress an
already stretched-thin judicial system in which public defense gets the short resource stick. In addition to scenarios of the type mentioned above, the potential
for absurd dilemmas became apparent in a recent congressional hearing on the
potential complications of decriminalizing marijuana possession in the District
of Columbia, a city policed by both federal and local law enforcement agencies.178 The subcommittee asked whether, under the proposed decriminalization, a marijuana possessor with one foot on city property and another on federal property would be punished under state or federal law.179 The Assistant Chief
of D.C.’s Metropolitan Police Department stated that he would enforce state
law, which makes possession of less than one ounce of marijuana subject to a
$25 civil fine post-decriminalization.180 On the other hand, the Acting Chief of
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the United States Park Police stated that he would enforce federal law, which
makes the same possession a jailable offense with a potential $5000 fine.181
Likewise, the federal-versus-state conflict produces non-criminal litigation,
which, again, compounds the overall burden on the judicial system as a
whole.182 For example, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled against Colorado citizen Brandon Coats in his wrongful termination suit against his former employer, Dish Network.183 Dish Network, which is headquartered in Colorado, fired
Coats for his legal use of marijuana despite Colorado’s “lawful” activities statute which prohibits employers from firing employees based upon engagement
in lawful activities off company property during nonworking hours.184 The
Colorado state court held that this Colorado statute did not protect a Colorado
citizen abiding by Colorado laws because federal laws rendered the lawful activity as unlawful.185 Adding insult to injury, Coats is a quadriplegic registered
for medical marijuana, and only used the substance at home, outside of working
hours.186
Further, the ongoing development, understanding, and opinions of existing
drugs, as well as the frequent creation of new drugs, will only add to the conflict inherent in a system where the federal government can proscribe this type
of private activity that individual states allow. For example, recent research
suggests that lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), which is categorized as a
Schedule I Controlled Substance with no accepted medical use in the United
States, may in fact offer positive, medicinal purposes.187 At the other end of the
spectrum, dangers surrounding synthetic marijuana—which goes by a variety
of other names, like “spice” and “K2”—raise the same fears and motivations in
the War on Drugs, which, in turn, leads to federal criminalization, and thus an
increase in the caseload demand on public defense.188 Synthetic drugs also add
additional legal nuance and complexity, as manufacturers can sometimes avoid
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prosecution by tweaking formulas and switching to varieties that are not exactly illegal.189
Recently, much attention has been directed towards kratom, a painrelieving plant from Southeast Asia, with parallels drawn between it and marijuana.190 Though some claim that kratom is effective in battling opioid addictions,191 others express concern regarding kratom’s own addictive properties
and other health-related dangers.192 In a familiar refrain, the DEA announced its
intent to categorize the active materials in the plant as Schedule I substances
because kratom “has a high potential for abuse, has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, and has a lack of accepted safety for
use under medical supervision.”193 Should the DEA decide to effectively make
kratom federally illegal, its action would strip the states of their sovereign right
to rule themselves, place non-conforming states in violation of federal law, and
add weight to the overall caseload demand, even though individual states are
already taking actions as they best see fit.194
B. Administration Currently in Session(s)
Adding an additional level of uncertainty, the 2016 Presidential election results brought a change in party—and thus, priorities—at the Executive branch
with the victory of Donald Trump.195 Any transition at the top will result in at
least marginal change and the proverbial growing pains therewith, though the
swing’s magnitude increases greatly when not just the President, but the controlling party also switches.196 Additionally, the current administration’s un-
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precedented nature generates an extra air of unpredictability and potential conflict.197
Regardless, the history of Jeff Sessions, Attorney General of the United
States—America’s top lawyer and chief law enforcement officer in charge of
the DOJ—provides insight on the expected direction of drug policy over the
next few years.198 Sessions is a staunch opponent of legalizing marijuana and
criticized his predecessors at the DOJ for not vigorously enforcing the federal
ban nationwide.199 When questioned at his Senate confirmation hearings about
conflicts with state drug laws, Sessions evaded the issue by saying only that he
would not commit to never enforcing federal law.200
Drug policy reformers such as Ethan Nadelmann, the Executive Director at
the Drug Policy Alliance, consider Sessions to be a nightmare for reform and
someone who will more strictly enforce existing drug laws.201 Sessions’s recent
action rescinding former President Obama’s memo to phase out the federal
government’s use of private prisons justifies Nadelmann and other reformers’
concerns.202 This rescission likely began an expansive rollback of the more relaxed criminal justice policies enacted under the Obama administration, such as
those directed against seeking mandatory minimums for nonviolent drug offenders,203 and not challenging marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington.204 Sessions further provided evidence of a justice policy reversal via his
May, 2017, memo directing federal prosecutors to seek the most severe charges
and sentences possible.205
197
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On the same day as Sessions’s rescission of the Obama memo, White
House Press Secretary Sean Spicer further confirmed the legitimacy of reformers’ concerns by stating in a press conference that action on marijuana use is a
question best suited for the DOJ.206 However, he also stated that he believes the
United States will see “greater enforcement of it.”207 Lest we brush off such
talk as hollow, Spicer also previously stated that the White House was “going
to strip federal grant money from the sanctuary cities and states that harbor illegal immigrants.”208 Soon after this threat, President Trump signed an executive order that allows for exactly that to vindictively punish non-conforming
cities and states.209
But what exactly does President Trump think of drug laws and enforcement? In the 90’s, Trump appeared to call for legalizing all drugs, though he
has since expressed support only for medical marijuana.210 While campaigning
as the Republican nominee, Trump stated that an administration under his
watch would “do” medical marijuana.211 He also indicated that states would retain authority to address the issue of legalization within their borders.212 However, he also said that Colorado now has “a lot of problems” as a result of decriminalizing marijuana.213
V. DEFENSE: THE LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY
The federalist principle of “states’ rights” implicates a simple yet sublime
idea: within fifty laboratories of democracies, i.e. the fifty states in the Union,
experimental ideas producing bad results can be tossed without damaging the
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nation, while successful ones can be propagated and nationalized.214 Republicans—the current dominant party—have enthusiastically supported states’
rights on a variety of issues.215 The more controversial topics debated in light of
states’ rights to experiment range from voter identification216 to abortion217 to
“transgender bathroom laws.”218
This section explores the arguably less-controversial topics of marijuana
prohibition and public defense in the light of federalism. First, the semipermissive federalism around marijuana laws sees positive experimentation results despite being stunted by prohibitive national drug laws and policies. Next,
the forced federalism of public defense struggles under the current framework
to produce the effective assistance of counsel the Sixth Amendment requires.
The Conclusion which follows suggests a complimentary blending of the two
inextricably-linked experiments.
A. The Recreational Marijuana Experiment
Despite what is said and done in and around Washington, D.C., both Colorado and Washington already provide evidence of drug decriminalization’s positive impact in multiple arenas, including the judicial system.219 Most relevant
to this Note are the specific benefits of unclogging the courts via fewer drug
arrests, and financial gains through reduced costs and increased tax revenue.220
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The results within these categories in the short time since Colorado and Washington legalized recreational marijuana are remarkable.221
Looking first to Colorado, the Drug Policy Alliance released a comprehensive report that provides data from the Judicial Branch of Colorado comparing
marijuana charges and arrests before and after the 2012 passage of Amendment
64, the state’s recreational marijuana bill.222 This report revealed that marijuana
arrests drastically plummeted, as one would expect, in Colorado after the passage of Amendment 64, with marijuana-related charges decreasing by about 80
percent.223 Additionally, and perhaps more surprising to some readers, all drugrelated charges—not just marijuana—decreased by 23 percent, which underscores the implications of marijuana legalization for general criminal justice
reform.224 Currently, data tracking the direct effect of this dramatic decrease in
drug charges on the caseloads of public defender offices in Colorado is unavailable. However, because drug violations categorically account for the largest
portion of arrests in America,225 and public defenders take a higher percentage
of drug cases,226 we can safely infer that Colorado public defenders have seen
their caseload demand significantly lessened.
In addition to the reduced costs of adjudicating eight thousand fewer marijuana cases per year, Colorado has also seen financial benefits in the form of
tax revenue.227 Thanks to over one billion dollars in marijuana-related sales on
the Colorado books for 2016, the state pulled in almost two hundred million
dollars in tax revenue.228 “The system is working,” stated Mason Tvert, Communications Director for the Marijuana Policy Project, regarding marijuana being properly tested, labeled, and legally sold to adults by licensed businesses
instead of illicitly on the street.229
Similarly, since Washington passed its recreational marijuana legislation, I502, marijuana sales have generated over eighty million dollars in tax revenue
while the state saved millions previously wasted on arresting and punishing
marijuana offenses.230 Specifically, filings in court for low-level marijuana of221
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fenses by adults dropped 98 percent in the time since voters approved the initiative.231 Since each individual arrest and prosecution for marijuana possession
costs Washington between one and two thousand dollars in police, prosecution,
defense, and court expenses, the state is now saving millions of dollars simply
by no longer adjudicating low-level marijuana offenses at the pre-initiative levels.232 Meanwhile, additional data shows that violent crime rates declined over
the same period, while traffic fatalities and youth rates remained steady.233 As a
result, Washington voters continue to support their decision to legalize recreational marijuana.234
On the same day that Secretary Spicer commented on seeing greater enforcement of federal prohibitions on medical marijuana, Quinnipiac University
released a poll showing that 93 percent of those surveyed support medical marijuana and 59 percent support legalizing marijuana for recreational purposes in
the United States.235 Additionally, the poll found that 71 percent of Americans
oppose the enforcement of federal prohibition laws in those states where marijuana is legal, whether for medical or recreational use.236 Also of note, every
demographic grouping in the poll supported this federalist position regarding
marijuana laws.237 Based upon public opinion and the positive results examined
for Colorado and Washington, the federal government should not frustrate the
people’s will and instead defer to the concept that states maintain police power
over laws that protect the welfare, safety, and health of individuals within their
borders.238
B. The Public Defense Experiment
Because Gideon did not dictate exactly how governments must operate to
ensure the Constitutional right to effective counsel, a “chaotic and patchwork
landscape” of widely disparate methods and results emerged across the nation.239 For example, states may use independent commissions, nonindependent commissions, partial commissions, or even no commissions to
cy.org/sites/default/files/Drug_Policy_Alliance_Status_Report_Marijuana_Legalization_in_
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administer and oversee their public defense systems.240 Additionally, state
funding varies from 100 percent supported by the National Legal Aid & Defender Association (NLADA) and ABA criminal justice standards down all the
way to 0 percent.241 Further, while some states maintain binding statewide or
jurisdiction-specific workload standards, others adhere to non-binding workload suggestions or even no workload limits at all.242 Finally, some jurisdictions
also contract out indigent clients to private attorneys, but the same restraints
remain, if not amplified.243
Regardless, one consistency does exist among all states: a shared absence
of the federal funding they need to provide the effective assistance of counsel
that the federal Constitution mandates.244 Because of this, only three reasonable
paths exist for addressing the public defense crisis wherein state laws do not
conflict with federal law. First, the federal government can drastically increase
public defense funding as needed for states to deliver Constitutionally mandated effective assistance of counsel per the caseload demand generated with current federal criminal laws and policies. Alternatively, the federal government
can renege on its promise of Constitutionally protected individual liberties by
redefining the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel to a lesser standard
for the states. Or, third, the federal government can modify certain federal
criminal laws and policies to reduce the caseload demand to levels where reasonable funding enables public defenders in the states to provide the effective
assistance of counsel required of them. Experimenting with this third option is
likely the most fruitful and palatable route, even before we entered the current
era of economic austerity and federal program cuts.245
CONCLUSION
The federal government shackles resource-strapped public defenders via
the failed War on Drugs without supplying the funds necessary to provide ef240
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fective assistance of counsel as mandated by the United States Constitution.
With a history of flexing authority over state marijuana laws,246 expectations of
even greater enforcement,247 and threats of future de-funding as punishment for
not conforming to executive mandates,248 the federal government unduly coerces states into maintaining costly drug laws which generate demands they cannot
afford to meet per Constitutional standards.
As a result, the War on Drugs breeds a systemic violation of the Sixth
Amendment by creating pervasive surrounding circumstances where the likelihood of effective counsel is so diminutive, a presumption of ineffectiveness is
appropriate. The argument that structural deficiencies created by the government can cause systemic—not just individualized—Constitutional violations so
severe to warrant extraordinary remedies is not a unique or novel idea.249 In
fact, the ACLU’s complaint against Fresno County alleged that structural deficiencies “systematically denied” indigent defendants their Constitutional right
to effective counsel at every critical stage of the criminal process.250 Additionally, because an estimated twenty-seven million Americans used illicit drugs in
2014, the systemic violation created by the War on Drugs would reach an absurd degree if states simply followed the path of strict, indiscriminate drug law
enforcement.251 Instead, the United States should end federal drug prohibition
and commit to repairing the structural deficiencies from the surrounding circumstances of the War on Drugs and which cause systemic Constitutional violations.
Though this Note’s Author suggests the best long-term solution to addressing the public defense crisis is to end the federal prohibition of every controlled
substance in the manner described below, this Note focuses primarily on ending
marijuana prohibition as the first major step. Three sets of facts beyond the
many debated benefits of marijuana use justify this narrowing to the recommended solution. First, marijuana accounts for the highest number of users and
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the highest number of arrests.252 Consequently, marijuana is the single drug
whose legalization would theoretically make the largest immediate impact upon
resources and caseloads. Next, marijuana currently enjoys overwhelmingly favorable public support for de-criminalization.253 Therefore, ending marijuana
prohibition is likely to be welcomed by the majority of citizens while being politically advantageous to those making the suggested change. Finally, a majority of states have already proactively initiated the de-criminalization experiment
and provided data that supports ending federal prohibition.254 Accordingly,
lawmakers could carefully study the evolving condition of public defense in the
recreational marijuana states, especially those with documented public defense
struggles like Nevada and California. Thus, ending federal prohibition of marijuana is the best solution because it affects the highest number of people while
making an immediate impact on structural deficiencies simply by acknowledging a path already trodden by individual pioneering states.
Since additional funding necessary to prevent Sixth Amendment violations
under current national policy appears unlikely at best, the federal government
must at minimum declassify marijuana as a Schedule I substance. Under a new
classification—one that could later be used for other illicit substances—the
federal government can declare these drugs to be dangerous, recommend state
prohibition, and still regulate interstate commerce that involves the substances.
Federal trafficking laws specific—and limited—to marijuana crossing state
borders would remain reasonable measures to achieve the compelling government interests that revolve around illicit drug smuggling. Individual states
could then decide on their local drug policies without fear of being in conflict
with federal law. Then, those states that take on the additional demand of waging the War on Drugs within their borders must supply public defense funding
sufficient to ensure free exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to effective
counsel.
Additionally, the federal government could still promote and endorse antidrug policies via Congressional authority under the Taxing and Spending
Clause of the Constitution in a manner similar to its use of highway funding to
encourage a minimum drinking age for alcohol.255 For example, businesses in
the marijuana industry could pay a yearly fee for a permit to be a licensed seller. These fees would create and replenish a federal public defense coffer. Then,
to encourage states to prohibit drug use, Congress could condition federal funding for public defense—pulled from the federal public defense coffer—on state
proscriptive laws.
In this hypothetical arrangement, a recreational marijuana state like Nevada
would not receive federal funding and their marijuana businesses would pay
252
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into the federal public defense coffer, but the state would still benefit by no
longer shouldering the War on Drugs’s burden. On the other hand, a state with
neither recreational nor medical marijuana would receive a share of funding
apportioned from the federal public defense coffer based upon the state’s population. Finally, states with medical-only marijuana would also be entitled to a
share of the federal funding, but perhaps not the entire share they would receive
with full prohibition. Consequently, the additional demand a state voluntarily
places on itself to conform to a desired federal policy would be offset by the
supply of additional funds provided by the federal government and obtained
from the non-conforming states.
Returning to Linda from the Prelude, the above hypothetical scenario still
places her in jail. Without alternative federal action—such as authorizing interstate transport of small amounts of marijuana between the recreational states—
Linda has still broken federal law. However, she is now much more likely to
receive the effective assistance of counsel the Constitution promises. This distinction should underscore that the purpose here is not to impede law enforcement. Instead, the goal is to prevent the surrounding circumstances of the War
on Drugs from causing systemic Sixth Amendment violations.
As previously stated, this Note primarily focused on a single prohibited
drug, yet this choice was simply because the effects, enforcement, and legislation surrounding marijuana are better known and documented. Further, since
marijuana’s usage is much more prevalent, it harbors the potential for making
the highest impact. Still, the same logical conclusions are easily extrapolated
onto other drugs. Thus, for the many reasons discussed, this Note recommends,
as a long-term solution, that the United States reserves laws regarding the personal consumption, possession, cultivation, and local distribution of all controlled substances to the state laboratories of democracy. However, these laws
must not give state governments a pass to violate Constitutional rights. As established by both text and history, these fundamental rights include the Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel. Citizens of the various states should not
accept a hostile federal government allowed to demand a standard for protecting individual rights against government oppression while simultaneously waging a war which leaves a devastated landscape barren of these same rights. Accordingly, the United States should rescue the Sixth Amendment from the War
on Drugs by releasing the states it holds hostage.
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